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1Internal Disaggregation in Oticon:
Interpreting and Learning from the Rise and Decline of
the Spaghetti Organization
Abstract
Infusing coordination mechanisms that are characteristic of market
organization in hierarchies has become a much-used way of
simultaneously increasing entrepreneurialism and motivation in firms.
However, such “internal hybrids” are inherently problematic, because of
fundamental credibility problems related to managerial promises to not
intervene in delegated decision-making.  This theme is developed using
the case of the Danish hearing aids producer, Oticon.  In the beginning of
the 1990s, Oticon became famous for its radical delegation experiment, the
”spaghetti organization.”  Recent work has interpreted the spaghetti
experiment as a radical attempt to foster dynamic capabilities by imposing
loose coupling on the organization (Lovas and Ghoshal 2000; Verona and
Ravasi 1999; Ravasi and Verona 2000), neglecting, however, that about a
decade later, many of the more radical elements of the spaghetti
organization have been left.  This paper presents an organizational
economics interpretation of the spaghetti organization and its subsequent
transformation. In such an interpretation, the spaghetti organization
imposed significant organizational costs that could be tolerated as long as
the benefits produced by the spaghetti organization dominated the costs.
One source of organizational costs that the paper focuses on turn on the
potential contradiction involved in combining a strong manager who
possesses ultimate decision rights with widespread delegation. A number
of implications are developed, both for the understanding of internal
hybrids, and for the more general issue of the distinction between firms
and markets.
2Introduction
Both in academic research and in managerial practice, the search for the sources of
sustained competitive advantage (Barney 1991) has increasingly centered on
organization related factors (e.g. Barney 1986; Kogut and Zander 1992; Mosakowski
1998). In particular, firms in “knowledge-intensive industries” are argued to
increasingly adopt ”network organization” (Miles and Snow 1992) and engage in
various kinds of ”corporate disaggregation” (Zenger and Hesterly 1997).  They do so,
and are advised to do so, so as to become the ”information age organizations”
(Mendelsson and Pillai 1999) that may foster those “dynamic capabilities” (Teece,
Pisano and Shuen 1997) that are necessary for competing in the emerging knowledge
economy. In other words, knowledge-based firm strategies are implemented by the
kind of unconventional combinations of coordination mechanisms (Grandori 2000)
that are often referred to in terms such as “new organizational forms” (Daft and
Lewin 1993), “the non-standard firm” (Helper, MacDuffie and Sabel 2000), or
“cellular forms” (Miles et al. 1997).
There is accumulating empirical evidence that firm sizes have been falling
worldwide during the last two decades as firms have engaged in downsizing, spin-
off and outsourcing exercises (Zenger 1997; Zenger and Hesterly 1997).   Thus,
established firms have increasingly left activities to the ”market,” meaning other
(often new) firms. Fundamental advances in IT and measurement technologies have
facilitated these changes, while equally fundamental developments in the
organization and motives of capital markets as well as increasing internalization
have made them necessary. Cutting size, spinning off business units, etc. reduce
coordination costs, improve incentives, and help to clarify the nature of the
businesses the firm is in.  Improvements in entrepreneurial capabilities as well as a
better ability to produce, share and re-produce knowledge often result (Grant 1996;
Day and Wendler 1998; Mosakowski 1998).
However, firms may be able to reach these goals in a different way ¾ albeit one
that to some extent also relies on market (-like) forces ¾ namely by disaggregating
3internal organization (i.e., adopting internal hybrids) rather than disaggregating the
corporation itself (i.e., adopting external hybrids or engaging in arms-length
contracting). A number of contemporary management practices, notably TQM
(Jensen and Wruck 1994) and knowledge management techniques (Mahnke 2001),
are basically internal hybrids (Zenger 1997).  From a short-run perspective, adopting
an internal hybrid form may have the benefit of involving fewer lay-offs relative to
adopting external hybrids or engaging in arms-length contracting.  Moreover, spin-
offs, carve-outs and the like are often legally quite complex operations, whereas
adopting an internal hybrid may be a matter of fiat, and will therefore be an
attractive alternative in terms of ink costs expended on corporate lawyers.1  Further,
management may fear that leaving too many activities in the hands of other firms
will hollow out the corporation (Teece et al. 1994).  Relatedly, considerations of
protecting valuable knowledge may enter the picture (Liebeskind 1996).
When presented in this way, one may wonder why firms should ever
disaggregate externally: The two alternative means of disaggregation appear to be
rather imperfect organizational substitutes.  Moreover, external disaggregation
seems to be both more painful (e.g., in terms of employee dissatisfaction), costly (e.g.,
in terms of lawyer bills), and risky (e.g., in terms of the risk of losing valuable
knowledge or being exposed to hold-up risks).  However, internal disaggregation,
that is, the adoption of internal hybrids, also has its distinctive ¾ but so far largely
neglected ¾ costs.2  The present paper is taken up with these.
Research on new organizational forms is clearly an emerging field. In
particular, little is known about the costs of new organizational forms, whereas the
benefits have arguably been more thoroughly examined.3  This is particularly the
case with internal hybrids.4 Therefore, empirical investigation in the form of rich,
                                               
1 On the related idea that there are fundamental legal differences between organizing transactions
inside the firm versus organizing across markets, see Williamson (1996).
2  However, for an early treatment, see Miles and Snow (1992).
3  This is exemplified and discussed in Mahnke (2001).
4  For example, recent work has treated the costs of external hybrids in terms of costs of establishing
and maintaining trust (Nooteboom 1999), or, conversely, the costs of being subject to hold-up (e.g.,
Williamson 1985, 1996).  Zenger (1997) argues that disproprotionately more scientific work exists on
4qualitative methods for data collection may be argued to be a necessary ingredient in
research into the costs of internal hybrids. The present paper mixes empirical
observation with theoretical reasoning about internal hybrids in an attempt to both
illustrate and challenge existing theory. The emphasis is on the costs of internal
hybrids, and in particular on commitment problems related to the delegation of
decision rights in firms.  The root of such problems is that delegated decision rights
in firms are always loaned from the holder(s) of ultimate decision-making rights,
namely the top-management and/or the owners.  Given this, the problem for top-
management and/or owners is to commit to real delegation (Baker, Gibbons and
Murphy 1999, 2000) and refrain from selective intervention (Williamson 1996).  This
is because selective intervention will harm incentives to invest in the accumulation of
firm or project-specific human capital and the initiation of entrepreneurial initiatives
(Aghion and Tirole 1997; Day and Wendler 1998; Foss and Foss 2000).
In the ensuing, these kinds of problems are discussed with reference to changes
in decision-making processes and administrative systems (i.e., the organization of
task division) that took place in the Danish electronics (primarily hearing aids)
company, Oticon A/S, beginning in 1991.  Oticon became world-famous for its
radical delegation and empowerment experiment ¾ aptly marketed as the
”spaghetti organization” ¾, which introduced “… revolutionary new assumptions of
what it meant to work and how one worked” (Gould 1994: 456).  The speed and
radicality with which then-CEO, Lars Kolind managed to accomplish this major
organizational turn-around, particularly in the corporate headquarters/development
parts of the Oticon organization, was another remarkable aspect of the experiment.
To many observers, Oticon seemed to be an embodiment of the pure project-based
organization as well as an outstanding example of achieving integration and
recombination of knowledge by means of loosely coupled administrative systems.
The spaghetti organization was explicitly seen as a hard-to-replicate source of
                                                                                                                                                  
external hybrids than on internal hybrids, investigation of the latter being largely confined to work on
the multi-divisional form.   Recent treatments that are related to the reasoning in this paper by also
adopting an overall organizational economics perspective include Zenger (1997), Zenger and Hesterly
5competitive advantage (Gould 1994). It is still being perceived as an outstanding
example of the benefits of a project-based organization that goes beyond the matrix
structure and carries internal disaggregation to an extreme (e.g., Lovas and Ghoshal
2000; Ravasi and Verona 2000; Verona and Ravasi 1999).  However, the spaghetti
organization in its initial radical form does not exist anymore in Oticon ¾ it has been
superceded by more structured administrative systems. The question why this
change has taken place will be addressed in the following in the context of the issue
of the costs of internal hybrids.
The design of the paper is the following.  The paper begins by developing an
organizational economics interpretation of the spaghetti organization (“The Spaghetti
Organization: Simulating the Market in Oticon”).  From this point of view, the spaghetti
organization appears at first sight to be a particularly well-crafted hybrid (cf. Zenger
1997).  Thus, it consisted of complementary elements that apparently formed a
coherent structure, and which was rapidly implemented.  Still, that organization
gave way to something far more structured. It does not appear plausible to ascribe
this organizational change to outside contingencies, such as new technological
discontinuities or to dramatic changes in strategic intent.  This suggests that that the
spaghetti organization may have been beset by organizational costs that may have
been unanticipated at the time of implementing the organization and which came to
dominate the benefit aspects, necessitating a change of administrative systems
(“Spaghetti and Beyond: Some Hidden Costs of Internal Hybrids”). I further argue that the
story of the Oticon spaghetti organization suggests important lessons about the limits
to delegating rights within a firm when the CEO and other top-managers in actuality
keep ultimate decision rights (“Discussion: Implications for Economic Organization”).
These implications are important for those firms that wish to implement internal
hybrids in the hope of fostering organizations that better utilize and develop new
knowledge.
                                                                                                                                                  
(1997), Day and Wendler (1998), and Mosakowski (1998).  Of these, only Day and Wendler (1998)
mention the commitment problems that accompany internal hybrids, and only very briefly.
6A Note on Method
Basic Method
A basic problem of undertaking research into the Oticon spaghetti experiment
is that few of those who were employed when the experiment was implemented in
1990 are still with Oticon, and the rest are very hard to locate.  Moreover, the
experiment was begun a decade ago, and recollections of it are likely to be strongly
influenced by rationalizations and other biases.   Therefore, I decided to mainly rely
on archival sources, newspaper and magazine articles, and, in particular, the large
number of very rich and thick descriptions of Oticon that have been produced by a
number of mainly Danish academics, journalists and Oticon insiders throughout the
1990s (in particular, Lyregaard 1993; Poulsen 1993; Morsing 1995; Søndergaard and
Døjbak 1997; Morsing and Eiberg 1998; Eskerod 1997, 1998; Jensen 1998).5
Thus, the approach followed with respect to understanding the nature of the
spaghetti experiment was more that of the historian than that of the qualitative
researcher trying to understand recent phenomena or ongoing change.  In other
words, the emphasis was more on evaluating, comparing and integrating written
statements relating to past key events (Van de Ven 1992) than on performing the
same operations on oral accounts relating to contemporary or ongoing events.  This
is a defensible research strategy, because the aim was not so much to uncover
hitherto unknown data relating to Oticon, as it was to develop a different
interpretation of already existing and very rich data, and discuss implications of this
interpretation.6
However, the prime mover behind the spaghetti experiment, then-CEO, Lars
Kolind, was interviewed (June 2000) about a number of specific issues that were not
adequately treated in the existing material.  He also commented upon earlier drafts
                                               
5 Actually, these are so rich that even very recent studies of Oticon, based on a large number of
interviews, such as Ravasi and Verona (2000) and Verona and Ravasi (1999) add rather little in terms
of descriptive detail.
6  For similar research methodologies, see the studies in Temin (1991).
7of this paper.  Also, the Oticon HRM officer was interviewed in a three hours, in-
depth interview (June 2000).  The interview mainly focused on the nature of recent
changes in administrative systems in Oticon.  A subsequent follow-up was
conducted to clarify details.  Interviews were semi-structured.
The Nature of the Inquiry
It is necessary to reiterate a methodological point already alluded to. Much of
the following represents an attempt to pursue as far as possible one specific
interpretation of one specific aspect of the Oticon spaghetti experiment ¾ namely, an
organizational economics interpretation of the organizational costs that this
experiment imposed on Oticon ¾, discuss why it was partially abandoned, and
tentatively draw some implications from this that challenge existing theory.
Organizational economics per se is hardly in an early stage of theory development
anymore, given that early work goes back more than six decades (Coase 1937) and
the last three decades have witnessed a flurry of work in this field.  There is therefore
little need for following a logic of grounded theory per se (Glaser and Strauss 1967;
Eisenhardt 1989).  However, a main purpose of conducting analysis of single cases is
to be able to pose competing explanations for the same set of events (and perhaps to
indicate how these explanations may be applied to other situations) (Yin 1989).
Allison (1971) is the classic exemplar here.  Moreover, basic considerations of internal
validity dictate that alternative explanations be considered.7
However, while I shall indeed make reference to other possible explanations of
the relevant events, the main emphasis is on developing the specific interpretation.
While an eclectic, multiple perspective approach may be superior in the abstract,
more insight may arguably be provided in the concrete by pursuing, in a relatively
narrow fashion, one specific interpretation and explore the limits of this
interpretation.  In addition, an adequate multi-perspective account of the spaghetti
experiment would require at least a book-length study.  Finally, the present account
                                               
7 Cf. Rumelt’s (1996) discussion of the famous Honda case.
8does not contradict existing accounts so much as it directs attention to a hitherto
neglected interpretation of important aspects of the Oticon spaghetti experiment.
The Spaghetti Organization:
Simulating the Market in Oticon
This section describes the Oticon spaghetti experiment as an example of adopting a
particular kind of internal hybrid and develops an organizational economics
interpretation of this. This is admittedly a somewhat narrow interpretation. Thus, a
recent cottage industry has treated the Oticon spaghetti organization in much
broader terms, namely as a particularly successful example of change management
(Peters 1992), business process re-engineering (Obolensky 1994), and visionary
leadership and strong corporate culture (Yamashita 1998; Jensen 1998).  In a more
specific vein, the spaghetti experiment has been used for the purpose of developing
notions of strategy making as “guided evolution” (Lovas and Ghoshal 2000), as well
as to discuss how the deliberate introduction of “structural ambiguity” through the
choice of loosely coupled administrative systems (Ravasi and Verona 2000) may help
to cultivate “organizational capabilities for continuous innovation” (Verona and
Ravasi 1999).
While not denying that the spaghetti organization may indeed have caused a
degree of innovativeness that might not have been obtainable in its absence, the
emphasis in the present paper is rather on the neglected cost side of the spaghetti
organization, and in particular on how the incentive problems alluded to above may
have been present in that organization.8  Identifying organizational costs not only
helps to better understand the relevant trade-offs of adopting a particular internal
                                               
8 Characteristically, the title of Ravasi and Verona’s (2000) study of Oticon is ”Organizing the Process
of Knowledge Integration: the Benefits of Structural Ambiguity” (my emphasis).  There is nothing
about the cost side of imposing loosely coupled administrative systems on an organization in their
paper.  However, note that although the interpretation developed in the present paper differs from
those presented in recent academic work on Oticon (notably Lovas and Ghoshal 2000; Ravasi and
Verona 2000; Verona and Ravasi 1999), it does not necessarily contradict these contributions, but is
complementary to these.
9hybrid in the first place9 ¾ it also helps to better understand further organizational
change.  In the following interpretation, the spaghetti experiment is approached as
an attempt to simulate a market in the internal organization of Oticon by adopting a
team-based organization that comprised the high-powered incentives, delegated
rights and autonomous adaptation properties characteristic of market organization
(Hayek 1945).
Oticon: Background
Founded in 1904 and based mainly in Denmark, Oticon (now William Demant
Holding A/S) is a world leader in the hearing aids industry.10  For a number of years
in the beginning to the mid-1990s, Oticon became one of the best-known and
admired examples of radical organizational turnaround. The turnaround aimed at
reaching the complementary goals of increasing employee empowerment and
responsibility, reducing product development cycles, increasing contact to
customers, mobilizing dispersed and “hidden” existing knowledge, and building
new knowledge ¾ all contributing to the explicitly stated strategic intent of
achieving (once again) world dominance on the hearing aids (Kolind 1990). Oticon
CEO, Lars Kolind, the architect of the spaghetti organization turnaround, became a
favorite of the press, consultants, and academics alike.11  In retrospect the reasons for
this are the following ones.
First, the experiment embodied a large number of those non-traditional
management practices that were gaining currency at that time.  It was seen, and
cleverly marketed, as an embodiment of loose coupling, project- and team-based
                                               
9 Thus, while recent studies of Oticon put most of the emphasis on dynamic efficiency (i.e., the
spaghetti organization as a means of fostering dynamic capabilities), the present paper put more of an
emphasis on static efficiency.  However, both considerations are necessary for getting a full picture of
efficient  organizational design (Ghemawat and Ricart I Costa 1993).
10 See Lotz (1998) for a careful analysis of the hearing aids industry, with particular emphasis on
patterns of innovation. The history of Oticon prior to the introduction of the spaghetti organization is
extensively covered in Poulsen (1993) and Morsing (1995), and, briefer, in Gould (1994) and Lomas
and Ghoshal (2000: 877-878).
11 The Oticon case is reported to be the best selling IMD case (Gould 1994) ever (Børsens
Nyhedsmagasin 8. november 1999). Kolind’s dramatic and symbol-laden way of implementing the
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organization and empowerment driven to their extremes.  Second, although other
firms adopted similar disintegration exercises, and had done so earlier (Semler 1989),
the turnaround in Oticon was remarkable for the speed with which it took place.
Third, the spaghetti organization apparently delivered rather quickly what was
expected of it.  Thus, it demonstrated its innovative potential by re-vitalizing
important, but “forgotten” development projects, that, when implemented in the
production of new hearing aids, produced significant financial results, essentially
saving the firm from a threathening bankruptcy, as well as by turning out a number
of new strong products.  The background to all this was the following one.
From being the world leader at a 15 % market share in 1979 and with
subsidiaries in West Germany, Great Britain, The Netherlands, the United States,
Norway, Switzerland, France, and Italy, Oticon lost that position in less than a
decade.  By the end of 1987, market share had fallen to 7%.  The results were massive
financial problems.  One rather direct cause of a continued fall in market share in the
last years of the 1980s was the introduction in 1987 by the US firm, Starkey of a new
hearing aid that was considerably more sophisticated than any existing Oticon
product.  More generally, the technological paradigm (Dosi 1982) in the hearing aids
industry was gradually changing through the 1980s from “behind-the-ear” hearing
aids to “in-the-ear” hearing aids (Lotz 1998).  The capabilities on which Oticon’s
success in the 1970s had been founded were miniaturization capabilities.  While these
had been critical for competitive advantage in the “behind-the-ear” hearing aid
paradigm, new technological capabilities in electronics, which were not under in-
house control by Oticon, were becoming crucially important in the emerging in-the-
ear paradigm.   Moreover, digital signaling processing was appearing as an
increasingly important technology that would transform productive processes in the
industry.  At the end of the 1980s, Oticon management had to realize that the
competition had leapfrogged Oticon in terms of technological developments and in
terms of reducing the time length of product development.  However, realizing this
                                                                                                                                                  
Oticon spaghetti structure as well as the structure (or, perhaps, non-structure) itself are still being
given extensive treatment in management textbooks (e.g., Boddy and Paton 1998).
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took time and was painful; acting on the realization was apparently even more
painful.
On all relevant accounts (e.g., Poulsen 1993; Gould 1994; Morsing 1995; Foss
and Hertz 2000), Oticon was locked into a competence trap that was reinforced by
strong groupthink (Janis 1983), characterizing both the management team and the
employees.  A symptom of this was that around 1980, the dominant opinion among
managers and people in development at Oticon was that the in-the-ear hearing aid
would turn out to be a commercial fiasco.  At any rate, in-the-ear hearing aids were
not Oticon turf (Poulsen 1993).  The self-image of the company clearly was one of
being a traditional industrial company with its strongest technological capabilities in
miniaturization and specialized in mass-producing the behind-the-ear hearing aids
and developing that technology incrementally.  The dominant ethos in the company
was one defined by engineering people, not by marketing people; technology, not
customers, was central.  Administrative systems were organized traditionally with
functional departments, the managers of which together constituted the senior
executive group.
When problems began to accumulate, various attempts were made to change
the situation; however, they were either too insignificant and incremental or did not
survive political jockeying inside Oticon.12  The executive team had been in control of
Oticon for just about thirty years. It was the same team who had taken the company
to a number one position in the world market in the late 1970s. As a consequence of
the mounting difficulties, Oticon’s Foundation Board decided that new management
was needed to handle the crisis.   In 1988 Lars Kolind assumed his position as new
CEO.  Holding degrees in mathematics and management, an important part of his
background was the international scout movement.13
                                               
12 For example, the executive of the international division launched a campaign to renew Oticons
image, called the” Partner Project.” The idea was to create a close relationship with hearing care
professionals all over the world, and to try to get a better idea of the customers’ needs in this way.
The project was killed when the three of the four senior executives did not support it (Poulsen 1993).
13 It is arguably significant that Kolind had been particularly impressed by the ability of that
movement to organize and coordinate large-scale gatherings (e.g., international jamborees) in an
efficient, flexible and rapid manner, not as a result of detailed planning and management, but rather
12
Upon assuming his new job, Kolind basically concentrated all decision-making
powers in his hands; for example, virtually all expenses, even trivial ones, had to be
approved of by him.  He used this centralization of power to cut costs dramatically,
implying lay-offs amounting to 15 % of the employees at the headquarters.
However, in a paradoxical way, he combined almost dictatorial concentration of
power with a great open’ness and with great communicative skills.  For example, the
rather drastic cost-cutting measures were very openly communicated, and their
necessity carefully explained.  About a year after assuming his position, Kolind
realized that the cost-cutting measures, which had almost immediately improved the
company’s financial situation, had been fully exploited.  Although the measures
were necessary and yielded substantial financial results, they were only short-term
measures.  They were inadequate to cope with the decisive changes that were
underway with respect to products and processes in the industry and which were
prompted by changing preferences on the part of customers towards more advanced
and aestetically pleasing designs and changing technologies (i.e., the application of
digital signal processing technologies). Something more radical was needed with
respect to the strategic orientation of the firm and the administrative systems that
could back this up ¾ trying it was made possible by the accumulation of substantial
slack resources which the cost-cutting exercise had produced.
Trying Spaghetti
That “something” was sketched in a 6 pages memo, presented to Oticon
employees on April 18, 1990 under the heading, “Think the Unthinkable” (Kolind
1990).  The objective of the vision embodied in the memo was to create an increase in
profitability by 30% over the next three years.  This required a change of corporate
vision and mission: The company should be defined broadly as a first-class service
firm with products developed and fitted individually for customers, rather than
narrowly, as a manufacturing company producing traditional high-quality standard
                                                                                                                                                  
as an emergent result of a strong and shared set of values that served to orchestrate and coordinate
decentralized initiatives.  Kolind’s reorganization of Oticon may be interpreted as an attempt to mimic
the coordination capabilities of the scout movement.
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behind-the-ear hearing aids.  Customer orientation should be key.  In order to meet
these objectives, the document sketched a complete overhaul of the Oticon
organization.  Kolind baptized the new organization the “spaghetti organization,”in
order to emphasize the point that the new organization should be able to change
rapidly, yet still possess coherence.  The new structure should be explicitly
“knowledge-based” (Kolind 1990) and “anthropocentric,” yet based on “free market
forces” (Lyregaard 1993).  It should therefore be capable of combining and re-
combining skills in a flexible manner, where skills and other resources would move
to those (new) uses where they were most highly valued, with only minimal
intervention on the part of Kolind and other managers being required to secure this
aim.
The new administrative structure was primarily to be implemented in the
Oticon headquarters (i.e., administration, research and development and marketing),
although various aspects of the spaghetti-organization were also implemented in the
production plant in Thisted (DK) and in various sales offices outside of Denmark.14
In order to symbolically underscore the fundamental transformation of Oticon, the
company headquarters moved, at 8 am on 8 August 1991, to a completely new
location in Hellerup just north of Copenhagen.  All of the furniture of the old
headquarters was auctioned off.  In the new building, all desks were placed in huge,
open office spaces.  Employees were not supposed to be permanently located at
particular desks, but should move flexibly from desk to desk, bringing only a trolley
with necessary paper with them.  Inside a huge glass tube, placed in the lobby of the
company headquarters, a steady stream of paper fell down, emphasizing the
ambition to run the headquarters in a virtually paper-less way.  Finally, all formal
titles were done away with.  Evidently, symbolism clearly loomed large in all of this.
Still, the initiatives with respect to the design of office space, etc. were quite
functional in supporting the fundamental changes in administrative structure that
the spaghetti organization implemented in the Oticon headquarters. Thus, the huge,
                                               
14  For details on the planning and implementation of the turnaround, see Gould (1994) and Morsing
(1995).   The reorganization plan was initially very strongly resisted by Oticon management.
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open office landscape constituted the physical infrastructure of an almost completely
flat organization that was supposed to work by means of principles that were
explicitly designed to emulate the functioning of a market system (Lyregaard 1993).
The new organization amounted to breaking down the old functional
department-based organization into an almost completely flat, almost 100 percent
project-based organization.  Departments gave way to “competence centers” (e.g., in
mechanical engineering, audiology, etc.) that broke with the boundaries imposed by
the old departments.  And rather than being assigned tasks from the above,
employees now had a choice to decide which projects they would join.  All projects
were to be announced on an electronic bulletin board, where employees who would
like to join them could sign in.  The much noted “multi-job” principle meant, first,
that employees were not restricted in the number of projects they could, and, second,
that employees were actively encouraged (and in the beginning actually required) to
develop and include skills outside their skill portfolio.15 Each project would hold
employees with different skills coming from development, marketing and the
production units.  Project managers were free to manage the project, as he or she
preferred, “management” being understood more in terms of playing the role of
facilitator and coordinator than that of a directing principal.   The project team was
required to undertake all the tasks connected with product development until the
product was successfully introduced in all markets.
 To make it possible for project teams to rapidly combine the right skills, the
new organization was founded on four fundamental ideas.  First, as already noted,
the traditional functional department structure was eliminated.  Instead, all activities
were now supposed to be organized by projects.  The philosophy behind this was not
only to make it easier to combine complementary skills on projects, but also to
eliminate department-specific group-think, a problem that had plagued the old
                                               
15  As Kolind explained to Gould (1994: 465): ”We quickly agreed that all employees would have a
portfolio of jobs, and we were tough; we said at least three jobs, with the main one in their profession
or using their greatest competence, and the other two in outside areas. This concept really expands an
organization’s resources: engineers are doing marketing, marketing people manage development
projects, and financial people help with product development.”
15
organization.  Second, new information technology systems were designed and
implemented to make it possible to coordinate plans and actions in such a
decentralized organization. The aim was to create a firm-wide information flow,
increasing employee understanding of company activities and making it easier for
project teams to form.  Moreover, the information-dissemination policy also helped
to break knowledge-monopolies left over from the old organization, although this
does not appear to have been an explicit aim.16 Everybody was supposed to have full
access to the same information. Third, in a move called the “breakdown of the
palace,” the traditional office was abandoned.  No one would have private offices or
fixed desks; instead, all employees were located in one large office.  At each desk
there was a workstation, including a cellular phone and a computer with access to all
information on the Oticon network.  The employees’ physical locations changed
according to the projects they worked on.  Coffee bars were strategically located
around the building to stimulate and encourage discussion, and a central spiral
staircase that was wide enough to permit chance encounters and dialogue, replaced
the elevators in the building.  Finally, Kolind worked hard to increase intrinsic
motivation by developing a corporate value base that strongly stressed
responsibility, personal development, and freedom.17
These fundamental organizing principles were backed up by other measures.
For example, Kolind introduced an employee stock program, which was motivated
by the need to raise needed additional money for the transformation.  He invested 26
millions DKK of his own funds in Oticon.  Project managers throughout the
organization received a considerable amount of decision making power.  Wage
negotiations were decentralized. The project managers ¾ that is, those managers
                                               
16 One of the means towards the end of creating a truly knowledge-based company was Kolind’s
dictate of a “no paper” policy.  In principle, every document had to be scanned into a computer, filed
there, and then being maculated, the goal being an elimination of 95% of all paper in the organization.
17 Although the variance on the distribution of salaries was increased as a result of the new reward
schemes that characterized the spaghetti organization, average salaries do not appear to have
changed.  In fact, average Oticon salaries have been, and still are, comparatively low, particularly for
software developers.  Arguably, intrinsic motivation is a key aspect of Oticon motivation policies. On
intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, and its implications for organization, see Frey (1997) and Osterloh
and Frey (2000).
16
who were supposed to possess the most intimate knowledge of employee skills and
efforts ¾ received the right to negotiate salaries.  Finally, although project teams
were self-organizing and basically left to mind their own business once their projects
were ratified, they were still to meet with a ”Project and Product Committee” once
every three months for ongoing project evaluation.
One of the things soon to be realized when the spaghetti organization became a
reality was that Oticon actually already had embarked upon a development project
for the in-the-ear hearing aid back in 1979.18  A result of the spaghetti organization
was that work on this old project was resumed.  Yet another positive outcome of the
spaghetti organization was that the development time of new products became half
of what it used to be. Thus, typical time-to-market was reduced to three years.
Customer orientation, another explicit aim of the spaghetti, also dramatically
improved.  In 1993, half of Oticon’s sales stemmed from products introduced in 1993,
1992 and 1991.  A total of 15 new products had been introduced since the
implementation of the new organization.  Moreover, the ambition to broaden the
business areas of Oticon was successful; it was characteristic of the new products that
they were not just hearing-aid hardware, but complete integrated hearing solutions,
many of them drawing upon recent advances in digital signaling processing
technology and embodying sophisticated software.  The two major innovations that
are usually directly ascribed to the increase in innovative capability that the spaghetti
organization fostered are MultiFocus from 1991 and DigiFocus from 1996.19  Both
represented strong technological discontinuities, the former by being the first hearing
aid that adjusted tonal balance and amplification in a fully automatic way, the latter
by being the very first fully digital hearing aid ever.  The technological trajectories
                                               
18 As one employee said: ”We had created a good structure with five people – each with their own
area of responsibility I was responsible for the ear plug. But at that time the organization simply
wasn’t functioning.  No-one really believed in it and there was no support” (Foss and Hertz 2000).
19 Today, MultiFocus is described by Oticon insiders as the product that saved the company from the
bankruptcy that would have been threatening in the somewhat longer run.  MultiFocus was the
world’s first fully automatic hearing aid with no user controls.  The device exceeded sales expectations
by more than 100 % (Gould 1994).
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defined by these two major product innovations yielded a number of more
incremental products in the following years.
 A recurring theme in academic treatments of the Oticon spaghetti organization
(Morsing 1995, 1998; Verona and Ravasi 1999; Ravasi and Verona 2000) is that an
important reason for the observed increase in Oticon’s innovativeness was ultimately
rooted in imposing a condition of loose coupling (Weick 1976) on that organization.
For example, Morsing (1998) argues that the project-based organization allowed for
fruitful conflicts that challenged established mindsets, broke old routines, and in
general fostered more new knowledge than in more quiet environments.  Ravasi and
Verona (2000) argue that loose coupling was achieved by introducing structural
ambiguity.  Thus, the breaking down of authority and roles accomplished by means
of introducing a radical project-organization amounts to a condition of structural
ambiguity.  In turn, this condition facilitated efficient and speedy integration and
production of knowledge, leading to “… the undisputed ability for continuous
innovation displayed by Oticon” (Ravasi and Verona 2000: 31).  While not
disagreeing with this interpretation per se, the following section presents an
alternative interpretation, based on organizational economics.  This interpretation
directs attention to other aspects of the spaghetti organization.  Moreover, it may
help to understand why the spaghetti organization was later modified.
The Spaghetti Organization: An Organizational Economics Interpretation
From an organizational economics point of view, the immediately noticeable
aspect of the spaghetti organization is the importance of the market metaphor in the
design of the new administrative structure.20 A sort of market it seemingly was.
Employees (particularly project leaders) were given many and quite far-reaching
decision-making rights. Development projects could be initiated by, in principle, any
employee just like entrepreneurs in a market setting, although these projects had to
pass, not the market test, but the test of receiving approval from the Project and
Product Committee.  Project groups were self-organizing in much the same way that,
                                               
20  It was used quite explicitly by Oticon insiders (e.g., Lyregaard 1993).
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for example, partnerships are self-organizing.  The setting of salaries was
decentralized to project leaders (Business Intelligence 1993). Most hierarchical levels
were eliminated and formal titles done away with, etc.  Thus, the intention was that
the organization should mimic the market in such dimensions as flexibility,
autonomy, flatness, etc.
Kolind’s explicit aim was to build an administrative system that was superior to
any other conceivable system with respect to discovering, building and combining
knowledge (Kolind 1994).  In a number of ways, the spaghetti organization did fulfill
this aim, and it was certainly much superior to the old hierarchical organization in
this respect.  A major problem that besets centralized decision-making systems ¾ in
large firms as well as in centralized economies ¾ is that they have difficulties
efficiently mobilizing and utilizing important local knowledge, such as the precise
characteristics of specific processes, employees, machines, or customer preferences.
As Hayek (1945) explained, the main problem is that much of this knowledge is
transitory, fleeting and/or tacit, and therefore costly to articulate and transfer to a
(corporate) center.21 Markets are not plagued by these type problems to the same
extent.  Rather than involving the transfer of costly-to-transfer knowledge to those
with decision rights (as in a command economy or a centralized firm), markets tend
to economize on the costs of transferring knowledge by instead allocating decision
rights to those who possess the relevant knowledge (Hayek 1945; Jensen and
Meckling 1992; Jensen and Wruck 1994).  In the process, markets ensure that, at least
as a broad tendency, rights to make use of resources will move towards those who
put the highest valuation on these rights.  Moreover, because people interacting
under market conditions are residual claimants on their own actions, effective use
will be made of rights.
XXXXXXXX Insert Table 1 here XXXXXXXX
                                               
21 Group think may exacerbate these problems, that is, make it even more costly to transfer knowledge
to those who are supposed to make decisions based on this knowledge (Janis 1983).
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The Oticon spaghetti organization was very much an attempt to mimic the
market in these dimensions (see Table 1).22 Thus, a basic problem in the old
organization had been that commercially important knowledge simply didn’t reach
the relevant decision-makers.  A reflection of this is the example, mentioned earlier,
of Oticon already having started an in-the-ear hearing aid development, but shelving
and forgetting that until the spaghetti organization recovered it.  By giving project
teams extensive decision rights, making ideas for projects public and requiring that
teams/project groups possessed the necessary complementary skills for a particular
marketing, research or development task, the spaghetti organization stimulated a co-
location of decision rights with local knowledge.  Those who held the relevant
knowledge should also have the authority to decide over the use of company
resources, at least within limits.
It is, of course, much the same co-location that takes place in a well-functioning
market.  However, the analogy is far from complete: Oticon remained a firm, not just
because of its continued legal status as such, but more fundamentally because the
pattern of income and decision rights that characterized even the strongly
decentralized spaghetti organization was one characteristic of a firm, not of a market.
It use of “free market forces” (Lyregaard 1993) was fundamentally a simulation, for
the full decentralization of decision rights that characterizes market organization
never took place in Oticon (and neither could it).   The decentralized market is made
coherent ¾ that is, individual decisions and plans are coordinated ¾ by means of
the price mechanism, various contractual institutions and norms and mores that
regulate the definition, exchange, and protection of property (decision) rights (Barzel
1997).  In lieu of a distinct price mechanism, the market-like spaghetti organization
                                               
22 In terms of the distinction between external and internal corporate disaggregation (Zenger and
Hesterly 1997), Oticon relied mostly on internal disaggregation.  The possibility of strengthening
incentives by relying on the real market (rather than the simulated internal one) by spinning off
functions and departments does not appear to have been seen as a serious alternative to internal
disaggregation.  The production of some ”discount” (i.e., inexpensive, low-tech) hearing aids were in
fact spun-off (with Oticon maintaining financial control over the spin-off), but this was clearly an
exception to the rule, and the company remains strongly vertically integrated to this day.  For
example, many of the machines used in the production plant in Thisted, DK, are actually produced in
a special department in the headquarters in Hellerup. Although a number of potential suppliers are
available, management questions their ability to deliver the right quality.
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was to be kept together by a shared set of values (Kolind 1994), advanced
information technology, the charismatic leadership of Lars Kolind himself, and, last
but certainly not least, by a committee, staffed by Kolind and three other managers,
the primary purpose of which was to approve of or reject proposed projects (the
Projects and Products Committee).  This committee, as well as the strongly
overlapping top management committee, were the real holders of power ¾ they
possessed ultimate decision rights ¾ and no secret was made of this.  The allocation
of rights that thus characterized Oticon ¾ that is, strong delegation of rights to
initiate and manage development projects combined with strong ultimate decision
rights that were controlled by the Projects and Products Committee ¾  may be seen
as a response to certain incentive problems.  However, ultimately that allocation of
rights fostered other incentive problems.
In general, firms confront a problem that markets confront to a smaller degree,
namely that of making sure that decision rights are utilized efficiently, in other
words, the problem of moral hazard.  There was no apriori guarantee that project
leaders and other employees would act in the interest of Oticon (and Oticon’s
owners). Several of the components of the spaghetti organization may be seen as
responses to this fundamental agency problem.  It is convenient to break the right to
allocate resources to a particular project down into groups of decision-making rights,
namely rights to 1) initiate a project, 2) ratify projects, 3) implement projects, and 4)
monitor and evaluate projects (cf. Fama and Jensen 1983).  Decision-making
processes in project-based firms rest on the allocation and exercise of such rights.
Thus, how these rights are allocated and exercised have profound implications for
the efficiency with which decision-making processes take place and for the outcomes
of these processes.  For reasons of efficiency, firms usually don’t concentrate these
rights in the same hands; rather initiation and implementation rights may be
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controlled by one person (or team) while ratification and monitoring rights are
controlled by other persons, usually hierarchical superiors.23
As noted above, this sort of allocation of control rights corresponds to that of
the Oticon spaghetti organization.  Thus, anybody could make initiate a project, in
the sense of sketching, making preliminary plans, doing the required calculations,
making contacts, etc.  However, projects had to be evaluated by the Products and
Projects Committee that was staffed by Kolind, the development manager, the
marketing manager and the support manager.  The Project and Products Committee
either rejected or approved of the project.  Although the ex ante criteria for getting a
project accepted by the Committee were not that harsh or encompassing ¾ projects
basically only had to somehow relate to the business areas of Oticon and to yield a
positive return over a three years period and with a discount rate of 30 % ¾ the
Project and Products Committee was the real holder of power in Oticon.  Frequent
intervention on the part of the Committee ex post made that clear to everybody.
Thus, projects were required to report to the Committee on a three months basis, and
the Committee could at any time halt or close down projects (something which
happened quite frequently).  Thus, decision management (i.e., initiation and daily
project management) was very strongly separated from decision control (i.e., project
evaluation and monitoring).  In other words, the internal market was, in actuality,
very much a managed one.  Although a considerable amount of variety was indeed
allowed to evolve, the selection over this variety was very much guided by the
visible hand of the Products and Projects Committee.
  From an organizational economics perspective, another notable (though
hitherto unnoticed) feature of the spaghetti organization is the extent to which it was
characterized by complementary elements, that is, organizational practices that formed
an interlocking system, feeding on each other (Milgrom and Roberts 1990; Zenger
1997; Baron and Kreps 1999).  Thus, widespread delegation of rights was
                                               
23  Exceptions may occur when giving subordinates more extensive rights (e.g., a package of initiation,
ratification and implementation rights) strengthens employee incentives (see Aghion and Tirole 1997;
Baker, Gibbons and Murphy 1999; and Foss and Foss 2000 for analyses of this).
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accompanied by making incentive systems and employee monitoring much more
fine-grained than they had been under pre-spaghetti administrative system. Much
wider dispersal of wages than in the old organization were allowed for, employee
stock ownership was strongly encouraged, and employees were monitored by an
elaborate system of evaluation, where their performance in 3-8 different dimensions
(depending on the type of employee) was examined (Poulsen 1993).  Another check
on behavior was supplied by the open office landscape and the strategically placed
coffee bars and staircases, which not only fostered knowledge exchange, but also
helped to build reputational effects (Eskerod 1997, 1998).
The fact that these organizational practices constituted a complementary system
also helps accounting for the speed and toughness with which Kolind managed the
transition from the old organization (also made up of complementary, yet different
organizational practices) to the new system.  It may be argued that transition had to
be accomplished in a ”big bang” manner (cf. Dewatripont and Roland 1995);
complementary systems are very hard to change efficiently in an incremental manner
(Milgrom and Roberts 1990).  In particular, vested interests, the efforts of rent-seekers
who try to defend established privileges, etc. may make transition hard.  In the
context of the implementation of the spaghetti organization, Kolind implemented it
in a big-bang manner so as to effectively break old commitments, make life hard for
those who had held power positions in the old organization, and create new
organizational expectations.  The change was clearly assisted by the symbolic acts
undertaken by Kolind.  More precisely, these helped to signal his commitment to the
change.  For example, Kolind’s 26 million Dkr investment was such an act of
commitment (Hermalin 1998). His attempt to infuse the organization with a strong
set of shared values may also be seen as a an attempt to assist the coordination of
multiple efforts in a decentralized setting while simultaneously keeping agency
problems at bay (Miller 1992; Kreps 1990).
Not only was the implementation of the spaghetti organization consistent with
basic organizational economics principles, the organization itself in many ways
conform to what would be prescribed by these principles.  Thus, Kolind rightly
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separated decision-management (the project teams) from project control (the Product
and Project Committee) (Fama and Jensen 1983), worked hard on developing a
corporate value base, and made employees residual claimants through the employee
stock schemes, all of which may be seen as responses to latent agency problems
introduced by the strong delegation of decision rights that characterized the
spaghetti organization. In other words, apparently Kolind did exactly what basic
organizational economics reasoning would instruct him to do. However, the
spaghetti organization as described above is no longer an accurate description of the
administrative systems characterizing Oticon.  Although Oticon headquarters is still
by any reasonable standard an organization characterized by much delegation of
decision rights, there has decidedly been a retreat from the spaghetti organization to
more structured administrative systems.
Spaghetti and Beyond: Some Costs of Internal Hybrids
A Puzzle
In an account of the spaghetti experiment, Gould (1994: 470) noted that “… Lars
Kolind’s vision was the right one for Oticon.  In any case, one thing was certain: there
could be no turning back.”  Kolind’s vision may indeed have the right one for Oticon
at the particular time in which it was implemented, but beginning in 1996, a
considerable “turning back” actually begun: Oticon embarked upon a partial
abandonment of the spaghetti organization.  What happened, and why?  This is a
puzzle because we have just noted that Kolind apparently got it right with respect to
organizational design.  The puzzle is aggravated by the fact that it does not appear
plausible to ascribe this organizational change to outside contingencies, such as new
technological discontinuities, changes in regulations and in the competition, or to
dramatic changes in strategic intent; nothing of the sort has happened.  The
argument in the following is that just as organizational economics provides an
interpretation of hitherto neglected aspects of the spaghetti organization, this body of
theory is also helpful for developing a highly plausible perspective on recent changes
24
in Oticon organizational structures.  In the light of this, it turns that a number of
design mistakes were in fact made when the spaghetti organization was initially
implemented.
Retreating From Spaghetti
The retreat from the radical spaghetti organization that Kolind had
implemented in 1991 began long before he resigned as CEO in 1998.  In 1996, Oticon
headquarters has been divided into three “business teams,” called “Team
Advanced,” “Team Technology,” and “Team High Volume.” These serve as a new
administrative layer relative to the original spaghetti organization, and function as
overall administrative units around projects.  Each business team is managed by two
team leaders, namely a technician and a person with marketing or human resource
skills.  These teams refer directly to Niels Jakobsen, the new CEO.
  In addition to the business teams, a “Competence Center” has been defined.
The unit is in charge of all projects and their financing and of an operational group
controlling administration, IT, logistics, sales and exports.  The Competence Center is
led by the chief HRM manager, Henrik Holck and comprises nine managers.  It is
one of the successors to the abandoned Project and Products Committee, but its style
of managing the projects is very different. In particular, the utmost care is taken to
avoid the erratic behavior with respect to intervening in already approved of projects
that characterized the Products and Projects Committee.  The team leaders and the
head of the Competence Center comprise, together with the CEO, the “Development
Group,” which may be seen as the second successor to the Products and Projects
Committee of the original spaghetti organization.   The Development Group, which
essentially is the senior executive group, is in charge of overall strategy making.
Most of the initiative with respect to starting new projects is taken by the
Development Group, although the need for employees to provide inputs in the form
of new project ideas is still stressed.   Many of the decision-making rights held earlier
by project leaders have now been concentrated in the hands of the Competence
Center, or the managers of the business teams.  For example, project leaders’ rights to
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negotiate salaries have been constrained.  Project leaders are appointed by the
Competence Center; the right to be a project leader is not something that one grabs,
as under the spaghetti organization.  Although multi-jobs/multi-tasking are still
allowed, they are not directly encouraged, and their prevalence has been much
reduced.  The electronic job bourse where anybody in the old spaghetti organization
could advertise projects and seek co-workers, but which never worked satisfactorily,
has been finally dropped.
 To sum up, recent changes of administrative systems at Oticon, beginning
around 1996 and after the major innovations of MultiFocus and DigiFocus, have
amounted to a break with the almost complete bottom-up approach that
characterized the original spaghetti structure.  Much of the initiative with respect to
product development efforts now comes from particularly the Competence Center.
More hierarchical layers have been introduced, and a number of the decision rights
that were decentralized under the spaghetti organization have now been
concentrated in the Development Group and the Competence Center.  Thus,
although Oticon is still characterized by considerable decentralization and delegation
of rights, many of the crucial elements of the spaghetti organization have been left.
What happened?
Some Likely Causes of the Partial Failure of the Spaghetti Experiment
An organizational economics perspective suggests that although the spaghetti
organization was characterized by substantial coherence obtaining between its
constitutive elements, it was still beset by a number of problems that may arguably
have been among the causes of its partial abandonment about five years later.   Some
of these are rather obvious, while some are more subtle.  It is convenient to group
them into problems of assigning the right people to the jobs, managerial competence,
multi-tasking, coordination, knowledge sharing, and influence activities.24
                                               
24  A further cause of the retreat from the spaghetti has to do with the fact Lars Kolind became
increasingly involved in managing acquired subsidiary companies.  He had to increasingly delegate
control over the headquarters to other members of the management team.  Much of the ”glue” of the
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 With respect to assignment, the spaghetti organization was still populated by a
number of employees whose mindset and competencies were characteristic of, and
therefore made them sympathetic towards, the old way of doing things, that is,
Oticon prior to the implementation of the spaghetti organization.   Aligning tasks
with such people in the new organization was inherently difficult, and some of these
people were basically idle or engaged in political fights that essentially destroyed
value.  These problems may have been aggravated by the fact that the spaghetti
organization had done away with most hierarchical levels, leading to a problem of
the allocation of managerial competence.  Competent and less competent people were
placed on the same level, having the same basic right to initiate projects and getting a
hearing before the Projects and Products Committee.  Thus, hierarchy couldn’t be
used anymore as a sorting mechanism for allocating skills so that those with more
decisive knowledge would obtain authority over those with less decisive knowledge
(Casson 1994).  In fact, the very notion that hierarchy may reflect this kind of
ordering of knowledge ran very much counter to the fundamental bottom-up
philosophy that animated the spaghetti organization (Kolind 1990). The spaghetti
organization sorted knowledge in a completely different ¾ horizontal rather than
vertical ¾ way. From an incentive perspective, the extremely flat spaghetti
organization implied sacrificing an incentive instrument: Hierarchical job ladders
could not any longer function as incentive mechanisms in their own rights, since the
spaghetti organization essentially abolished conventional tournaments between
managers.
As mentioned earlier, a key ingredient of the spaghetti organization was the
notion of multi-jobs where each employee was encouraged to not only engage in a
broader set of tasks than he had under the old organization, but also to develop skills
that were outside his present skill portfolio and apply these ¾ in other words, to
engage in multi-tasking (Holmström and Milgrom 1991).  Much work on Oticon has
treated the multi-job principle as a strong stimulus to knowledge exchange and
                                                                                                                                                  
spaghetti organization may have consisted in the unique communicative and leadership skills of
Kolind.
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integration, for example, because it encouraged employees to participate in more
than one project at a time (e.g. Verona and Ravasi 1999; Ravasi and Verona 2000).
However, there is strong evidence that the principle also had its significant costs.25
Under the spaghetti organization, one could in principle join any number of projects
one wanted to.  There were no regulations relating to this, and nobody kept track of
the total time spent on the projects one had joined.26  Moreover, project leaders were
free to try to attract those who worked on competing projects, and in many cases
they succeeded in doing so.  This was a consequence of the explicit aim to emulate
the market, but the effect was that it hard to commit people to projects.  This led to
severe coordination problems, because project leaders had very little guarantee that
they could actually carry a project to its end, given that anybody at the project could
leave at will, if noticing a superior opportunity in the internal job market.  Moreover,
many joined more projects than their time resources possibly allowed for, creating
problems of coordinating schedules and work hours. Apparently, reputation
mechanisms were not sufficient to cope with these problems.
The key idea behind the spaghetti organization was to foster an administrative
system that was far superior to the old one (and to any other conceivable system) in
discovering, building and utilizing knowledge.   Although this may have been partly
achieved, the cost side of relying on a simulated market for accomplishing these
goals was the stated intentions of making Oticon a knowledge-sharing environment
were frustrated.  Rather than freely exchanging knowledge with everybody else,
knowledge tended to be held back within projects, because of the widespread, and
correct, perception that projects were essentially in competition over resources.
Thus, by stressing so strongly a market-like competitive ethos and by making
                                               
25 Eskerod (1997, 1998) in particular documents this.  My later interview with the chief HRM officer
strongly confirmed Eskerod’s finding that the multi-job principle had rather severe costs in terms of
problems of coordination and frustrating employees.
26  And neither would this have been possible, as nobody in Oticon, not even the Projects and Product
Committee, kept track of the total number of development projects.  In the spaghetti organization,
records were only kept of the 10-20 major projects.  An estimate is that under the spaghetti
organization, an average of 70 projects were continously running (Eskerod 1998: 80).  This also helps
explaining why the initial objective performance measurement systems were left: Because nobody
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incentive systems more “high-powered” (Williamson 1996) than they had been
under the old organization, the spaghetti organization to some extent worked against
its stated purposes. Monitoring systems apparently couldn’t cope satisfactorily with
these problems.27
Finally, influence activities seems to have been important under the spaghetti
organization. These denote those activities inside an organization that aim at
influencing hierarchical superiors to make decisions that are in one’s interest rather
than in the organization’s (Milgrom 1988; Schaefer 1998; Argyres and Mui 2000).
Resources expended on influence activities are, from the point of view of the
organization, waste.  The spaghetti organization which amounted to creating
competition between project groups for the approval of the only relevant
“hierarchical superior” left, namely the Projects and Products Committee, arguably
produced such influence activities.  Personal relations to those who staffed the
Committee became paramount for having a project ratified by the Committee. As
Eskerod (1998: 80) observed:
Part of being a project group may be lobbying in the PPC trying to obtain
a high priority status by influencing the PPC members.  The reason for
doing this is that a high priority project is regarded as a very attractive
place for the employees, because the management sees this project as
important.
It is, however, not clear from the empirical studies on the spaghetti organization
that this was perceived as a serious problem in the organization, for example,
whether it resulted in obviously unimportant projects being approved of by the
Committee.  Rather, it was taken as a unavoidable, and relatively small, cost of the
spaghetti organization.28  There is, however, another incentive problem that was
                                                                                                                                                  
(except the employee himself) kept track of an employee’s total time allocation across projects, many
of the relevant measures simply were not available to monitoring managers.
27  Possibly as a reflection of these problems, the most crucial variable with respect to determining
salary changes in the present organization is the degree to which an employee contributes to
knowledge-sharing.
28  Interview with HRM manager Henrik Holck.
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fostered by the spaghetti organization, and which arguably was an important cause
of the partial demise of that organizational design.
The Inherent Difficulties of ”Playing Market”
  As Mises (1949: 709) explained, there are inherent problems involved in
”playing market,” that is, infusing hierarchies with coordination mechanisms
characteristic of market organization.29  With reference to various socialist schemes of
his day that tried to preserve some market relations while eliminating capital and
financial markets, Mises argued that these schemes would be unworkable.
Importantly, the concentration of ultimate decision-making rights and
responsibilities, and therefore ownership, in the hands of a central planning board
would dilute the incentives of managers.  Thus, while planning authorities could
(and according to the schemes of the day, should) delegate rights to make production
and investment decisions to managers, these rights were likely to be used
inefficiently.  First, because managers could always be overruled by the planning
authorities, they were not likely to take a long view, notably in their investment
decisions.  Moreover, because managers were not the ultimate owners, they were not
the full residual claimants of their decisions and, hence, wouldn’t make efficient
decisions.   Therefore, Mises declared, the attempt to ”play market” under socialism
would only lead to inefficiencies.
As later research has clarified, the problem may be handled if the planning
authorities can credibly commit to a non-interference policy.  However, doing so will
typically be very hard, since reneging on a promise to delegate will in many cases be
extremely tempting and those to whom rights are delegated will anticipate this.
Transaction cost economist, Oliver Williamson (1996) refers to these kinds of
problems in terms the ”impossibility of (efficient) selective intervention.”  He
describes it as
                                               
29 Relatedly, the literature on internal transfer prices has revealed the existence of various incentive
problems that may beset this organizational practice (Eccles 1986; Holmström and Tirole 1991).
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… a variant on the theme, “Why aren’t more degrees of freedom always
better than less?.” In the context of firm and market organization, the
puzzle is, “Why can’t a large firm do everything that a collection of small
firms can and more.” By merely replicating the market the firm can do no
worse than the market.  And if the firm can intervene selectively (namely,
intervene always but only when expected net gains can be projected), then
the firm will sometimes do better.  Taken together, the firm will do at least
as well as, and will sometimes do better than, the market (1996:150).
Williamson flatly argues that selection intervention is ”impossible.” Incentives are
diluted, because the option to intervene ”… can be exercised both for good cause (to
support expected net gains) and for bad (to support the subgoals of the intervenor)”
(Williamson 1996: 150-151).  Promises to only intervene for good cause can never be
credible, because they are unenforcable. However, the conclusion that ”selective
intervention” is strictly impossible may not be correct.  It is in fact conceivable that
the intervenor may credibly commit to not intervene in such a way that the ”subgoals
of the intervenor” are promoted.
The logic may be stated in the following way (cf. Baker, Gibbons and Murphy
1999).  Assume that a subordinate initiates a project.30  Assume further that the
manager has information that is necessary to perform an assessment of the project,
but that he decides upfront to ratify any project that the subordinate proposes.
Effectively, this amounts to full informal delegation of the rights to initiate and ratify
projects ¾ ”informal,” because the formal right to ratify is still in the hands of the
manager and because that right cannot be allocated to the subordinate through a
court-enforceable contract (cf. Williamson 1996).   Because the subordinate values
being given freedom, this will induce more effort in searching for new projects
(Aghion and Tirole 1997; Foss and Foss 2000).  The expected benefits of these
increased efforts may overwhelm the expected costs from bad projects that the
manager has to ratify.  However, the problem is that because the manager has
                                               
30  This should be understood in a broad sense: A “project” may refer to many different types of
decisions or clusters of decisions.
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information about the state of a project (”bad” or ”good”), he may be tempted to
renege on a promise to delegate decision authority, that is, intervene in a “selective”
manner.  But if he overrules the subordinate, the latter will lose trust in him, holding
back on effort.  Clearly, in this game a number of equilibria are feasible   What
determines the particular equilibrium that will emerge is the discount rate of the
manager, the specific trigger strategy followed by the sub-ordinate (e.g., will he lose
trust in the manager for all future periods if he is overruled?), and how much the
manager values his reputation for not reneging relative to the benefits of reneging on
a bad project (for details and extensions, see Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 1999).
Selective Intervention in Oticon
It is arguable that one of the reasons why the spaghetti organization was
changed into a more hierarchical, but still essentially project-based, organization has
to do with the sort of problems described by notions of selective intervention and the
related problems.  Thus, the official rhetoric of a flexible market-based structure, with
substantial autonomy and the management team (i.e., the Projects and Products
Committee) as little more than facilitator and coordinator (Kolind 1990; Lyregaard
1993), was increasingly at odds with the frequent selective intervention on the part of
the Projects and Products Committee.   Selective intervention was partly motivated
by the fact that the
…PPC does not make general written plans, which are accessible to the
rest of the organization … if this were done, plans would have to be
adjusted or remade in an ever-continuing process, because the old plans
had become outdated  (Eskerod 1998: 80).
Thus, instead of drafting and continuously revise plans under the impact of changing
contingencies, the PPC preferred to intervene directly in projects.  In fact, this was
taken by the PPC to be a quite natural feature of a flexible, project-oriented
organization   (Eskerod 1998: 89).  However, this modus operandi led to diluted
incentives and strongly harmed intrinsic motivation (as documented at length by
Eskerod 1997, 1998).
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 Thus, the frequent intervention and changing priorities of Kolind and the
Products and Projects Committee caused mounting frustration among employees.
This frustration finally resulted in a major office meeting in 1995, announced as
“Shoot at top management!”  This meeting marks the beginning of the retreat from
the pure spaghetti organization. On that meeting employees dramatically expressed
their concerns about the gap between the Oticon value base and the delegation
rhetorics on the one hand, and the way in which the company was actually run on
the other hand. To some extent, wage issues appears to have been involved: Many
employees apparently felt that the emphasis of Oticon remuneration schemes was
too much on intrinsic motivation and too little on extrinsic (pecuniary) motivation.
But it was also a matter of frustration that projects were interrupted in seemingly
arbitrary ways and that the organization was far better at generating projects than at
completing them.
 The present Oticon organization is characterized by a much more consistent
approach towards projects on the part of the Competence Center (one of the
descendants of the Products and Projects Committee). Organizational expectations
appear to be that priorities do not change in the rapid and erratic manner that
characterized the original spaghetti organization, and that employees can be much
more sure that the projects they are working on are taken all the way to the end.   In
the new organization, projects are rarely stopped or abandoned, and there is a stated
policy of sticking to ratified projects.  Two reasons are given for this: First, projects
now rest on generally more secure ground, having been more carefully researched
beforehand.  An aspect of this is that the Competence Center now much more
actively puts forward projects ideas, contact potential project leaders, etc., rather than
elying on the bottom-up approach that characterized the original spaghetti
organization.  Second, the wish to avoid harming motivation (i.e., diluting
incentives) by overruling going projects is strongly stressed.  Apparently, present
Oticon management has realized the need to credibly commit to a policy of non-
interference with going projects.   If the present analysis is correct, one of the main
problems of the old spaghetti organization was that Kolind and the Products and
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Projects Committee never committed in this way; neither, apparently, did they
intend to do so.  Kolind’s view appears to have been that in important respects and
in many situations, they were likely to possess decisive knowledge, and that efficient
utilization of resources dictated intervening in, and sometimes closing down,
projects.  However, that view clashed on a basic level with the rhetoric of widespread
delegation of decision rights.
Discussion: Implications for Economic Organization
The purpose of the present section is to tease out some possible implications and
wider ramifications for the understanding of economic organization from the Oticon
spaghetti organization and from those theoretical insights that have been applied to
the interpretation of that administrative system.   Particular emphasis is on the limits
to applying principles that are characteristic of markets inside of firms, that is, the
crafting and implementation of internal hybrids.
Remediable Design Mistakes?
In order to discuss possible implications of the spaghetti experiment, some
other possible interpretations must first be treated.  The story that has been told in
the preceding pages essentially is that the original, almost completely flat spaghetti
structure foundered on, first, its market-like character working against its stated
purpose of building, integrating and sharing knowledge, and, second, the
contradiction involved in combining widespread delegation of decision-rights with a
frequently intervening top-management team in the form of the Products and
Projects Committee.  A possible implication is that Oticon adopted a too market-like
mode of internal organization.  However, a counter-argument is that although Oticon
may have made mistakes in the design of the spaghetti organization, these mistakes
were essentially remediable.   And if that is the case, one cannot necessarily infer that
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Oticon adopted a too market-like mode of internal organization.  The reverse may in
fact be true: The spaghetti organization wasn’t sufficiently market-like.31
It should be granted that many of the problems that beset the spaghetti
organization were, in principle, remediable design mistakes.  The problem, however,
is whether they were truly remediable in the practical context of the spaghetti
organization. For example, the problems of multi-tasking/multi-jobs may have been
reduced by simply prohibiting employees from working on more than, say, two
projects that could not add up to more than 100 % of the employee’s total work
hours.  In fact, the more structured project organization gradually implemented from
1996 has established controls that secure that the coordination and time-allocation
problems that beset the original spaghetti organization are kept at bay.   Establishing
such controls in the original spaghetti organization would, however, have run
against the official rhetoric of autonomy and delegation.  Monitoring systems might
have been refined to control more dimensions of employee behavior; etc. However,
the very elaborate monitoring system that was implemented together with the
spaghetti organization and involved the construction of objective measures on half a
dozen aspects of employee behavior (Poulsen 1993) appears to have been quickly
and tacitly shelved and substituted with a simpler system that relied much more on
subjective performance assessment (Business Intelligence 1993).  This suggests that
the problem with monitoring systems under the original spaghetti organization was
that they were already too complex.
Since behavior was apparently difficult to measure, a more output-based
system could have been tried (Prendergast 1999).  For example, one may imagine a
system of contracts that specified rewards for specific accomplishments (e.g., a
system that rewarded according to milestones in a development project).  In fact, this
would have made the spaghetti organization even more market-like.  However, it is
doubtful whether such a contract could actually be made court-enforceable.  Because
                                               
31  Thanks to Anna Grandori for suggesting this possibility.
35
of the resulting commitment problem, the contract system would have to rely on
reputation effects.32
Even if the spaghetti organization might conceivably have dealt with such
problems, other problems may have been harder to fight under this organization.
For example, it is inherently difficult under an organization such as the spaghetti
organization to protect against influence activities.  A comparative advantage of the
traditional, hierarchical and rule-governed organization is exactly that it may be
better at protecting itself against influence activities. This because what each
employee is allowed to do, and perhaps say (Argyres and Mui 2000), is simply much
more narrowly circumscribed than in an loose-coupled organization such as the
Oticon spaghetti organization (Milgrom 1988).33  In such an organization, trying to
handle influence activities by means of managerial discretion (i.e., exercise of
ultimate decision rights) is inherently problematic.
Finally, provided the above problems could have been dealt with, the original
spaghetti organization might conceivably have been a viable discrete organizational
form if Kolind and the Products and Projects Committee could in fact have
committed to a non-interference policy from the outset.   However, in the specific
case of the spaghetti organization, this was hardly an option, given that the emphasis
on organizational flexibility was explicitly taken to imply that projects could be
closed based on the fiat of the Projects and Products Committee.
New Organizational Forms
The concept of ”new organizational forms” has been increasingly utilized lately
as a label for various changes in organizational forms towards external and internal
corporate disaggregation (Bowman and Singh 1993; Zenger and Hesterly 1997).  It
                                               
32 And let us not forget that one of the advantages of internal organization is the savings on the costs
of using the price mechanism (Coase 1937).
33 This is not to say that ”non-traditional” organizational forms are necessarily beset with influence
costs.  See Argyres and Mui (2000) for an excellent analysis of how organizations may commit to
certain rules that regulate what is acceptable discourse.  Those rules reflect a trade-off between the
benefits of organizational learning stimulated by dissenting opinion and the costs of rent-seeking
activities that are pursued in the organizational conversation.
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covers both new ways of designing the boundaries of the firm (e.g., novel sourcing
arrangements, new types of licensing agreements, virtual corporations, etc.) as well
as new ways of designing internal organization (e.g., new ways of structuring the
employment relation). As a number of writers have observed, new organizational
forms mix in novel ways means of allocating resources that are characteristic of the
market with means of allocating resources that are characteristic of the hierarchy
(Jensen and Meckling 1992; Hennart 1993; Jensen and Wruck 1994; Zenger and
Hesterly 1997; Mendelsson and Pillai 1999; Grandori 2000; Helper, MacDuffie and
Sabel 2000). The ”swollen middle” (Hennart 1993) seems to have become the
dominant mode of organizing transactions, so that the polar modes of elementary
organizational of pure hierarchical planning and pure markets are increasingly seen
as descriptively irrelevant.
The forces leading to new organizational forms being increasingly adopted are
many.  Thus, some argue that the increasing reliance on specialist knowledge in
production renders the traditional employment contract increasingly obsolete and
necessitates organizational structures characterized by a high degree of
empowerment (Hodgson 1998).  Others argue that the increasing importance in
production of knowledge capital (Boisot 1998) implies that ownership-based
definitions of the boundaries between firms and markets (as in Hart 1995) become
increasingly irrelevant (Zucker 1991).  Others point to the increasing importance in
knowledge-intensive industries of combining knowledge inputs, sourcing
knowledge for this purpose, and keeping knowledge-sourcing options open (Helper,
MacDuffie and Sabel 2000).  These drivers are also instrumental in fostering internal
hybrids, such as the Oticon spaghetti organization.
Implications for Internal Hybrids
There is empirical support for the proposition that, as a broad tendency, there
has been an increasing adoption of internal hybrids (Mendelsson and Pillai 1999;
Zenger and Hesterly 1997). Proponents of internal hybrids argue that their main
advantages lie in the ability to integrate virtues of more established organizational
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forms that are particularly crucial under knowledge-intensive conditions.
Specifically, internal hybrids combine the ability to achieve efficiencies through
specialization that characterizes the functional form with the relative independence
that can be granted in an divisional form and the ability to transfer resources and
capabilities across division and business unit boundaries that characterize the matrix
organization (e.g., Miles and Snow 1992).  As Miles et al. (1997: 7) argue:
A number of leading companies today are experimenting with a new way
of organizing – the cellular form.  Cellular organizations are built on the
principles of entrepreneurship, self-organization, and member ownership.
In the future, cellular organizations will be used in situations requiring
continuous learning and innovation.
These are exactly the kind of arguments that were invoked by the proponents of the
Oticon spaghetti organization (Kolind 1990, 1994; Lyregaard 1993).  In turn, this
suggests that we may learn something from the Oticon experience about the limits to
internal hybrids.34
A basic proposition in much of organization theory is that for reasons of
efficiency (or, “norms of rationality”), organizational forms are aligned with
environmental conditions, strategies and exchange conditions in a systematic and
discriminating manner (Thompson 1967; Williamson 1996; Nickerson and Zenger
2000).  An implication is that mixing very different coordination mechanisms may
lead to efficiency losses.   Some proponents of new organizational forms argue that
mechanisms for coordinating economic activities are more malleable, and that the set
of stable discrete governance structures (i.e., clusters of coordination mechanisms) is
larger, than what is conventionally assumed in much of organization theory and in
the economics of organization (e.g., Grandori 2000; Helper, MacDuffie and Sabel
2000).   In contrast, Zenger (1997: 4) argue that attempts to infuse hierarchies with
coordination mechanisms characteristic of market organization often  ”… violate
patterns of complementarity that support traditional hierarchy as an organizational
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form.”  For example, managers implement new structures without new performance
measures and new pay systems, or they implement new pay systems without
develop new performance measures (see also Baron and Kreps 1999).
The present paper has illustrated the importance and the difficulty of “getting
the complementarities right.”  Thus, one of the interesting features of the spaghetti
experiment was exactly that it seemed to consist of highly complementary
organizational elements.  For example, delegation of decision rights was
accompanied by performance pay and measurement and by making employees
residual claimants through stock ownership programs.  However, this was not
sufficient to secure the viability of the spaghetti organization.  The fundamental
problem, it has been argued, was that the managerial commitment problem was not
recognized, or at least not recognized as a part of the problem of achieving
complementarity between organizational elements.
It has not been argued that a radical internal hybrid, such as the spaghetti
organization, is impossible to efficiently craft; however, it has been argued that  the
design problem is a very tough one. The fundamental problem is that decentralizing
an organization by means of delegation of rights to carry out certain actions (hiring,
training, sourcing, pricing, etc.) amounts to ”playing market” (Mises 1949: 709).  It
can never really be market exchange, because, unlike independent agents in markets,
corporate employees never possess ultimate decision rights. They are not full
owners.  This means that those who possess ultimate decision rights can always
overrule employees.  Thus, credibly committing to a policy of decentralization and
delegation is a major problem, for top-management in firms as well as for
governments and other rulers.35
Arguably, such insights greatly advance the analysis of the extent to which
coordination mechanisms may be efficiently combined, and dispels ill-founded ideas
                                                                                                                                                  
34  Zenger (1997) addresses the design of internal hybrids.  His focus on the need to implement
complementary organizational elements parallels the approach here.
35  Economic historians put much emphasis on this, seeing credible commitment issues as
determinative of long-run growth (Rosenberg and Birdzell 1986; North 1990).
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that such mechanisms may be combined more or less at will.  The theoretical
implication is that although notions of “coherent” organizational forms,
characteristic of older organization theory, may appear crude today (Grandori 2000),
what may be needed is not discarding the basic idea that there are indeed discrete
organizational forms with different efficiency properties for certain environments,
but rather a more refined analysis of the limits within which coordination
mechanisms may be combined (idem.).   A more practical implication is that, if
theoretically founded reasoning suggests that a certain organization form may be
inefficient, attention may be directed to other modes of economic organization.  For
example, external disaggregation may be a more viable long-term option than
internal disaggregation (Day and Wendler 1998; Baker, Gibbons and Murphy 1999)
because its incentive properties are superior.
Finally, it should be noted that although some of the members of the large and
expanding set of new organizational forms may indeed be founded on inconsistent
combinations of coordination mechanisms, the attendant losses in terms of increased
coordination costs, misaligned incentives, etc. may be more than offset by gains in
dynamic efficiency.36  If indeed the Oticon spaghetti organization was inefficient with
respect to the organization of its administrative systems, it is hard to dispute the
proposition that it was also a quite innovative organization.  These benefits may
likely have overwhelmed the organizational costs.37
                                               
36  Also, Nickerson and Zenger (2000) suggest that considerations of efficiency may dictate modulating
between discrete organizational forms in response to a stable set of environmental conditions.  This is
because the steady-state functionality delivered by a discrete organizational form may itself be
discrete, and the desired functionality may lie in between those delivered by the discrete
organizational forms.  Efficiency gains may then be obtained by modulating between the forms.
37  At least for some time.  It may be noted that the retreat from the spaghetti organization began when
the major innovations of Oticon had been introduced, thus suggesting that organizational costs might
have begun to overwhelm gains in terms of dynamic efficiency.  The organization has not yet come up
with something as radical as the 1996 DigiFocus.
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Conclusions
To many firms, disaggregation is increasingly seen as imperative (Day and Wendler
1998). However, disaggregation may be accomplished by means of external
disaggregation/hybrids, internal disaggregation/hybrids, or some mixture between
the two.  The present paper has examined a concrete (internal) disaggregation
episode in the light of organizational economics. The Oticon spaghetti organization
accomplished in a number of ways what it was intended to, notably an increase in
innovativeness.   However, it has been suggested that a number of inefficiencies were
present in that administrative structure, which led to a more hierarchical structure
being adopted.   In particular, the attempt to “play market” in Oticon foundered on
the basic problem of doing so.  One of the main rationales of firms is exactly that they
may avoid the high-powered incentives that characterize markets (Williamson 1985;
Holmström and Milgrom 1991), and structure monitoring and reward schemes in
ways that are generally not available to markets (Holmström 1999).   Arguably, the
spaghetti organization was carried too far in its emulation of the market.  Moreover,
there was a basic problem of credible commitment, one that centered on the apparent
inconsistency between a policy and rhetoric of widespread delegation, emphasis on
responsibility, etc. on the one hand, and a managerial practice of shifting priorities
and intervention and closing down of projects on the other hand.  If the
interpretation in this paper is correct, these were significant causes of the retreat from
the spaghetti organization.
 An overall theoretical implication of the story told in the present paper is that it
matters whether knowledge-based networks are organized within or across the
boundaries of the firm (cf. Baker, Gibbons and Murphy 2000).  This is not only a
matter of the appropriability of valuable knowledge (Liebeskind 1996).  First,
incentives differ between markets and firms.  Knowledge sharing, one of the main
stated aims of the spaghetti organization, is not necessarily best stimulated by
market-based project organization.  To the extent that knowledge sharing is a hard-
to-measure performance variable, employees are likely to put less of an emphasis on
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this.  Upon realizing this, resort to lower-powered incentives is likely (Holmström
1999).  This corresponds to what took place in Oticon, where it was realized that the
internal market produced not only benefits with respect to knowledge-integration,
but had certain harmful effects on knowledge-sharing.
Second, it remains the case that markets don’t rely on resource-allocation by
means of authority whereas firms do (Coase 1937).  “Authority” is a dangerous word
because it is easily invested with a too narrow meaning, for example, detailed
direction and supervision.  However, authority also means setting boundary
conditions for a relation, such as, trivially, deciding that employees of our firm
cannot also be employees of another firm (Holmström 1999), or, less trivially,
defining what is acceptable discourse within a firm (Argyres and Mui 2000).    And
ultimately, the meaning of being a boss is that one can restrict the decisions of one’s
subordinate, overrule him and perhaps fire him. In turn, this means that although
decision rights may be delegated, we can still trace the chain of authority in a firm,
and we will always realize that ultimate decision-making power resides at the top.
In a sense, all subordinates’ decision rights “are loaned, not owned” (Baker, Gibbons
and Murphy 1999: 56).  Fundamentally, it can never be otherwise.  This is because
ultimate decision-making rights can only be transferred from bosses to subordinates
in one way, namely by transferring ownership (Hart 1995).  However, transferring
ownership amounts to spinning off the person to whom ownership is given.  It
means creating a new firm.
These insights suggest that there is reason to be skeptical of sweeping claims
that economic activity, being knowledge-based and highly dependent on personal
relations, will increasingly taking place in networks that cut across the boundaries of
the firm, that formal authority will vanish in importance, and that firms will
therefore merely be legal shells around knowledge-creating activities.  To be sure,
formal authority may vanish in importance in an increasingly knowledge-based
economy.  But if that is the case, this may not be because firms’ internal organization
becomes increasingly characterized by delegation of rights.  Rather, it may be that the
number of firms increase, because the only efficient way to cope with the
42
commitment and other incentive problems caused by increasingly knowledgeable
employees may be to spin them off, that is, let them create their own companies.
On the level of research methodology, this paper may be taken as supporting
the position that there are fruitful complementarities between organization theory,
organization behavior and strategy approaches on the one hand, and organizational
economics insights on the other hand (cf. also Argyres and Mui 2000; Mahnke 2001).
Thus, the spaghetti organization may indeed be understood in terms of an attempt to
foster dynamic capabilities through imposing loose coupling and structural
ambiguity on an organization (Ravasi and Verona 2000).  But from an organizational
economics perspective, that organizational form also represented a matrix of rights
and incentives that are helpful for understanding its liabilities, and how these
liabilities gave rise to certain organizational dynamics (i.e., the partial avandonment
of the spaghetti organization).
Finally, with respect to managerial implications, the implication of
organizational economics is to “get the incentives right.” In contrast, the present
paper has stressed  “get complementarities right,” and particularly “make
commitment credible.”  A further implication is to not focus in an isolated manner on
a particular type of corporate disaggregation. Notably, because internal
disaggregation, at least to the extent that it emulates market organization, may be
inherently hard to efficiently craft, managers should always consider whether
external disaggregation (spin-offs, outsourcing, carve-outs, etc.) may be efficient
alternatives to internal disaggregation.  And if internal disaggregation is in fact
chosen, the present analysis directs attention to the paramount importance of
credibly committing to the specific form adopted and not undermine it by erratic
selective intervention.
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TABLE 1
Market Organization and the Spaghetti Organization Simulation
Market Organization The Spaghetti Organization
Freedom of contract. Approximated by delegating rights to
join projects.
High-powered incentives. Variable pay; initially based on objective
input and output measures.
Dispersed residual claimancy. Employee stock schemes.
Dispersed decision rights. Very widespread delegation of rights.
Resource allocation decentralized, and
strongly influenced by local
entrepreneurship.
Local entrepreneurship very strongly
encouraged. Relatively easy to get
projects approved.
Allocation by means of pricing. Transfer prices not used.
Legal independence between parties
(contract law).
Employment contracts (employment
law).
